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23 
Privilege and Responsibility 
Arthur F. McEvoy  
INTRODUCTION 
Some twenty years ago, Stephanie Wildman began writing about 
privilege: an integrated, multi-layered, and largely invisible system of 
social hierarchy that sustains inequality and subordination in our 
culture and works in mysterious ways to confound whatever efforts 
people might make to ameliorate them.
1
 Our legal culture permits us 
to attack discrimination, in some of its manifestations, when we can 
identify deliberate acts of individuals that cause harm to others 
because of their social status. The culture makes it difficult, however, 
for us even to talk about the networks of privilege that tacitly assign 
people to subordinate categories because of their race, their gender, 
or any other of the innumerable characteristics by which people 
distinguish themselves from others. Wildman’s signal contribution 
has been to identify privilege as a social system, as well as to build 
concepts and vocabulary with which to make it “visible.” Since 
Wildman established the paradigm in her 1996 book, Privilege 
Revealed, academic writers have analyzed the structure and dynamics 
of privilege in a great many areas. Simply recognizing privilege 
requires a great deal of effort, particularly when the writer shares in 
 
  Associate Dean for Research and Paul E. Treusch Professor of Law, Southwestern 
Law School, Los Angeles, CA 90010. amcevoy@swlaw.edu. Thanks to Danni Hart, Gowri 
Ramachandran, David McFadden, and the West Hollywood Public Library, not to mention the 
editors at the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy. 
 1. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE REVEALED]. See also Stephanie M. 
Wildman, Privilege, Gender, and the Fourteenth Amendment: Reclaiming Equal Protection of 
the Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 707 (2004); Stephanie M. Wildman, The 
Persistence of White Privilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 245 (2005). For an earlier 
symposium on Wildman’s work, see Angela P. Harris, Symposium: Introduction, 34 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 409 (2000). 
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it: the problem of counteracting its role in the subordination of people 
by category has received somewhat less attention. 
Privilege, Wildman taught us, is inexorable. Privilege orders 
people’s perception of themselves, their ideas about the world, their 
behavior in society. “It appears as the fabric of life,” as Wildman put 
it: “as the way things are.”2 It works as invisibly and as pervasively 
as gravity, or a magnetic field: it requires no act, no deliberation, not 
even awareness on the part of the people who ratify and reproduce it 
in countless ways, large and small, every day of their lives. Privilege 
is not necessarily the same thing as subordination, but privilege is to 
subordination as water is to fish; it is a kind of ether that pervades 
society and culture, outside of which there exists no frame of 
reference from which to talk about it, much less to exert leverage 
against it. 
One can avoid privilege, then, neither by wishing it away, nor by 
pretending that it doesn’t exist, nor, indeed, by analyzing it in 
classrooms and academic journals. Renouncing society by, for 
example, joining a monastic order or taking up life on the street, 
would leave the interwoven gradients of one’s privilege 
undiminished: individuals are powerless to nullify whatever privilege 
they enjoy because it is the culture, not the individual, that identifies 
and ranks whatever characteristics one has or does not have. If 
anything, dropouts reinforce the network of privilege to the extent 
that they also renounce whatever power they might have to fight 
oppression. One can’t avoid the privilege that comes with being 
white or wealthy or male or attractive or, for that matter, an American 
citizen. One can only exercise whatever privilege one has, 
responsibly or not. Responsibility, then, is what distinguishes the 
political fact of subordination from the ether of privilege in which it 
propogates. 
This Essay argues that exercising privilege responsibly is 
particularly difficult in the United States, whose culture rests more 
than any other on formal commitment to the equality and dignity of 
the individual. This is because our legal culture not only disavows 
privilege formally but also shifts responsibility for the moral 
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character of people’s social behavior away from individual actors and 
onto the abstract institutions of politics and markets. The synthesis of 
the two—formal disavowal of privilege in public life and the moral 
enchantment of politics and markets
3—was the work of the original 
Founders: a uniquely privileged group of aristocrats who tried to 
broaden the franchise for what they called “virtuous” self-
government, with remarkable but mixed results. There are, 
nonetheless, recessive traditions in American legal culture that have 
both recognized the existence of different kinds of privilege and the 
duty of citizens to exercise privilege responsibly in the name of 
political equality and human dignity. Together, these recessive 
traditions offer suggestions, at least, of what morally responsible 
politics might look like. 
I. PRIVILEGE DIVORCED FROM VIRTUE 
Privilege was the birthright of people like the American Founders, 
well-to-do men brought up in eighteenth-century North Atlantic 
culture. It entailed such rights as self-ownership, property, and some 
degree of political franchise: rights which the natural order of things 
made more or less unavailable to people who occupied lesser stations 
in life. Eighteenth-century privilege also, however, entailed the 
responsibility for virtue: the capacity to act selflessly for the good of 
one’s household as well as for that of the community at large. George 
Washington and others who carried out the American Revolution 
were, for the most part, aristocrats who took the responsibility for 
civic virtue very seriously.
4
 Their great contribution was first to 
theorize and then to build a political system in which ordinary people 
(which they generally understood to include adult white male 
property holders of whatever means) could govern themselves—to 
 
 3. On “enchantment,” see PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 97–98 
(1998); Susan S. Silbey & Patricia Ewick, The Double Life of Reason and Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 497, 504 (2003). 
 4. On the problem of virtue during the Revolutionary period, see GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776 1787, at 65 70 (1969).  
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refute “those who wish it to be believed, that man cannot be governed 
but by a rod of iron,” as Jefferson put it.5 
The Founders’ ultimate strategy was to economize what innate 
resources of virtue were available to common people so that 
government “would go of itself” without hereditary rulers. 
Confederation-era governments tried to inculcate among citizens the 
self-sacrifice and community-mindedness required for self-
government, although the experiment was on the whole a miserable 
failure. The historic achievement of the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention was to design a frame of government in which competing 
selfish interests would cancel each other out and thus, on balance, 
permit the common interest of the whole people to direct affairs of 
state. In this, the Founders did remarkably well, although in the 
process they severed the bond between privilege and responsibility 
that had underwritten order and progress in the eighteenth-century 
Atlantic community. 
Unlike those of our day, Revolution-era constitutions were as 
careful to lay out the responsibilities as they did the liberties of 
citizens. One of the most distinctive of these instruments was that of 
Pennsylvania, which a convention proclaimed within months of the 
Declaration of Independence and which endured until 1790.
6
 It began 
with a sixteen-point declaration of the rights of the commonwealth’s 
inhabitants, the fourteenth of which affirmed  
[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a 
firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, 
and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings 
of liberty, and keep a government free: The people ought 
therefore to pay particular attention to these points in the 
choice of officers and representatives, and have a right to exact 
a due and constant regard to them, from their legislatures and 
magistrates, in the making and executing such laws as are 
necessary for the good government of the state.
7
 
 
 5. THOMAS JEFFERSON, KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS (1798), reprinted in DOCUMENTS 
ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606 1863, at 287, 293 (Howard W. Preston ed., 1886). 
 6. WOOD, supra note 4, at 226 37. 
 7. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV. 
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Moving beyond mere exhortations to public virtue, the Pennsylvania 
Constitution directed that “[l]aws for the encouragement of virtue and 
prevention of vice and immorality, shall be made and constantly kept 
in force.”8 Other sections provided for militia service9 and rotation in 
office so that “more men will be trained to public business”.10 Section 
36 reminded citizens that “every freeman to preserve his 
independence, (if without a sufficient estate) ought to have some 
profession, calling, trade or farm, whereby he may honestly subsist” 
and so discouraged the pursuit of public office as a career. Indeed, 
whenever a public office “becomes so profitable as to occasion many 
to apply for it,” Section 36 directed the Legislature to reduce its 
compensation.
11
 In a way foreign to us, Revolutionary-era 
governments took active roles in cultivating civic responsibility 
among members of the commonwealth. 
Famously, the experiment failed, and Confederation-era politics 
fell into chaos.
12
 Hamilton and Madison catalogued the problems of 
the revolutionary governments in The Federalist; chief among these 
was citizens’ tendency to divide themselves into factions and to 
hijack the machinery of the state in pursuit of particular economic 
interests, religious persuasions, or sectional loyalties. “As long as the 
connection persists between [people’s] reason and [their] self-love,” 
Madison wrote, “this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual 
animosities” would remain so powerful that civic virtue—the 
capacity to restrain one’s pursuit of advantage for the benefit of 
others—“will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one 
party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the 
whole.”13 “Because the passions of men will not conform to the 
dictates of reason or justice without constraint,” as Hamilton put it,14 
simply exhorting citizens to virtue would not by itself keep popular 
government from flying apart at the seams. At the same time, while 
for the state itself to cultivate virtue in the citizenry was apparently a 
 
 8. PA CONST. of 1776, § 45. 
 9. PA CONST. of 1776, § 5. 
 10. PA CONST. of 1776, §§ 8, 11, 19. 
 11. PA CONST. of 1776, § 36. 
 12. WOOD, supra note 4, at 393 429. 
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 13, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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vain effort, Madison was convinced that for the state to suppress the 
tendency to faction would require stifling people’s liberty 
altogether.
15
 
The Founders’ great achievement was to design a frame of 
government that would economize what natural virtue was available 
among the citizenry, while simultaneously allowing people to spend 
most of their energy on self-advancement and tolerating the 
ephemeral, factional passions that distracted them from their 
responsibilities to others. In The Federalist No. 10, Madison 
explained how normal politics under the new constitution would 
equilibrate itself: the sheer size of the national republic would make it 
difficult for factional interests to capture the entire government.
16
 In 
No. 48, Madison insisted that division of authority among the three 
branches of the new government would likewise keep power divided 
and difficult to concentrate under the control of particular factions.
17
 
In No. 32, Hamilton showed how the division of sovereignty between 
state and national governments would likewise equilibrate politics 
under the new system.
18
 In No. 78, finally, Hamilton justified life 
tenure for federal judges in similar terms, as “an excellent barrier to 
the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”19 The 
appointment process would guarantee that only people who “unite the 
requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge” would staff the 
federal bench,
20
 while the security of tenure on good behavior would 
insulate them from political influence and set up yet another 
“safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the 
society.”21 The Constitution was “a machine that would go of 
itself”:22 inspired by the now-abstracted will of “the People” and no 
longer dependent on the virtue of real individuals, be they hereditary 
aristocrats or common citizens.  
 
 15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 13, at 78 (James Madison). 
 16. Id. at 82 84. 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 13, at 308 11 (James Madison). 
 18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 13, at 197 201 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 13, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 20. Id. at 471. 
 21. Id. at 470. 
 22. The phrase is that of the late nineteenth-century Romantic poet James Russell Lowell. 
See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 18 (1986). 
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Unlike its Confederation-era counterparts, the 1787 Constitution 
makes no effort to school citizens in republican virtue. To the 
contrary, it takes a realistic view of politics, makes “proper 
deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature” (as Hamilton 
put it),
23
 and allows people to exercise their franchise by their own 
lights. Its profusion of checks and balances and its fractionated 
centers of authority—each of them constituted in a different way—
guide power through many channels, in theory so that factions and 
other ephemeral perversions of the public good tend to cancel each 
other out and that more rational, widely shared (if sometimes 
recessive) ideas reinforce each other and thus, on balance, guide 
public affairs in wholesome directions. The Founders thus designed 
the Constitution to channel politics in progressive directions, in the 
same way that their contemporary Adam Smith thought that the 
Invisible Hand of market forces steered economic development.
24
 
The kinship is significant: in the nineteenth century, when Americans 
came to think of public life more in market than in political terms, the 
Constitution’s solution to the problem of republican virtue would 
justify similarly agnostic, laissez-faire attitudes toward economic and 
social relations as well.
25
 
At the time in which our fundamental public institutions—free 
markets and republican governments—came into being, privilege was 
a visible, tangible force: conferred by birth, manifest in the social 
order, and underwritten by natural law. It conveyed economic and 
political franchise to those who enjoyed it and withheld it from those 
who did not. It also carried with it, theoretically, responsibilities 
toward one’s community and one’s dependents. The critical problem 
of the Revolution, as the Founders saw it, was to keep the virtue that 
inhered in the people as a whole from being overwhelmed by 
individual self-striving and factional politics. Their solution was to 
rely on the collective institutions of law and markets to aggregate 
people’s limited resources of virtue and neutralize their tendencies to 
 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 13, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 24. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 484 85 (Edwin Cannon ed., 1994). 
 25. J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY UNITED STATES 40 (1956). 
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vice. In the process, however, they relieved individuals of 
responsibility for disciplining their striving to the public good. 
II. RESPONSIBLE POLITICS: A RECESSIVE STRAIN IN AMERICAN 
CULTURE 
Popular sovereignty, at once reified and harnessed by the 1787 
Constitution, released a historically unprecedented burst of creative 
energy in the nineteenth-century United States.
26
 Courts and 
legislatures systematically dismantled traditional impediments to self-
striving in all areas of law, from contract to crimes to coverture.
27
 By 
the end of the century, Americans had transformed a string of 
maritime provinces into the world’s largest industrial power. Political 
invention was nearly as widespread as the mechanical kind: Indian 
tribes and refugee slaves no less than millenarians and Mormons tried 
to build “communities of the right sort” beyond the reach of 
established authority, while feminists and abolitionists hectored those 
in power on duties that lay beyond the mere piling up of wealth. Most 
successful was the synthesis of liberal democracy and capitalism that 
the Founders had set in motion, although it depended critically on the 
twin crimes of Indian genocide and African slavery as well as on the 
profligate waste of the continent’s natural resources.28 
For the most part, the nearly limitless franchise that came with 
American citizenship carried with it few responsibilities to other 
people or to the public at large. Property in slaves carried with it 
privileges to rape, batter, and kill; most of the killings of Indians on 
the frontier took place not at the hands of soldiers but of individuals 
and gangs, typically in retaliation for purported injuries to settlers’ 
property or persons.
29
 The monstrous, unbounded privilege of 
 
 26. The term “release of energy” is that of J. Willard Hurst. Id. at 7. 
 27. See id. at 13 28; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 
120 39 (3d ed. 2005). 
 28. HURST, supra note 25, at 70.  
 29. On the rape of slaves and Indians see SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: 
MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 150 73 (1975); see also PAUL A. DAVID ET AL., RECKONING WITH 
SLAVERY: A CRITICAL STUDY IN THE QUANTITATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGRO HISTORY 
57 69, 134–61 (1976); on Indians, see, e.g., SHERBURNE F. COOK, THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
THE CALIFORNIA INDIAN AND WHITE CIVILIZATION 329 46 (1976) (“Sex and Family 
Relations”); id. at 259 67 (“Military Casualties” and “Social Homicide”). 
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slaveholding so corrupted the Republic as to bring it to civil war, just 
as unregulated capitalism brought it low during the Great Depression 
of the twentieth century. In both of those cases, Americans rebuilt the 
Constitution by enfranchising new groups of people: emancipated 
slaves during Reconstruction and industrial workers during the New 
Deal. In neither case, however, did Americans remake the peculiar 
relationship between privilege and responsibility that defined 
American liberty, regardless of how far the franchise extended. 
There runs through American history, however, a recessive strain 
that explicitly links privilege with responsibility in ways that have 
adapted the eighteenth-century idea of civic virtue to the liberal 
democracy of the modern era. One can see this recessive strain at 
work in the area of late nineteenth-century race relations, in the 
ideology of the New Deal, and in the work of the mid-twentieth-
century Catholic Left. Other examples abound; the ones offered here 
are by no means systematic and appear here by way of illustration 
rather than logical proof. They are instructive in that they arose at 
times of significant upheaval in the country’s social order; they arose, 
also, in the context of privilege regimes—of race and class—that 
remain critical today. Together, they offer hints at what a politics of 
responsibility might look like. 
A. Emancipation and Race Privilege: Abraham Lincoln, John 
Marshall Harlan, Mary Church Terrell 
Of all the social characteristics to which privilege attaches itself, 
none carries more weight than race. African slavery was the bedrock 
on which the U.S. economy developed; slavery and its aftermath 
organize American politics today no less than it did at the Founding. 
Indeed, Americans developed their very concept of what it meant to 
be a free person by way of contrast to the lives of the slaves on whose 
labor their progress depended. No white person in our history 
understood this better than Abraham Lincoln—few persons in our 
history have articulated so clearly the responsibility that race 
privilege carries with it. 
Lincoln understood clearly, before he became President, that 
slavery was incompatible with the ideals of the American Revolution 
and that survival of the Revolution itself—“the last best hope of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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earth”—depended on its eradication.30 In his second inaugural 
address, at the end of his life, he spoke of the Civil War as atonement 
for slavery: 
. . . if God wills that [the war] continue until all the wealth 
piled up by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of 
unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood 
drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the 
sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be 
said “the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous 
altogether.”31 
Newspaper accounts of the speech expressed bewilderment as to the 
meaning of Lincoln’s words, although they noted that black people in 
attendance offered praise to God throughout, responding as if to a 
sermon in church.
32
 Earlier in the war, Lincoln insisted that slavery 
was as much the responsibility of Northerners as Southerners: 
It is no less true for having been often said that the people of 
the South are not more responsible for the original introduction 
of [slave] property than are the people of the North; and when 
it is remembered how unhesitatingly we all use cotton and 
sugar and share the profits of dealing in them, it may not be 
quite safe to say that the South has been more responsible than 
the North for its continuance.
33
 
Lincoln was certainly not the first to realize this; Quaker merchants, 
who were familiar with the slave trade, washed their hands of it in the 
early nineteenth century, while abolitionists and feminists of both 
races spoke eloquently of the corruption that slavery worked in 
 
 30. Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in 6 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 126, 142 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1897) 
 31. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in 6 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 276, 277 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
 32. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863 1877, 
at 4 (1988); RONALD C. WHITE, JR., LINCOLN’S GREATEST SPEECH: THE SECOND INAUGURAL 
181 83 (2002); Garry Wills, Lincoln’s Greatest Speech, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1999, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/issues/99sep/9909lincoln.html. 
 33. Lincoln, supra note 30, at 137. 
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individuals and society, North and South.
34
 His writings evince a 
profound moral education over the course of his presidency; 
however, a few Republican leaders in Congress evolved in similar 
ways during Reconstruction, as they learned by stages how deeply 
social change would have to go to emancipate the freed people in any 
meaningful way.
35
 
Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan (the Elder) of the U.S. 
Supreme Court also spoke of atonement in race relations, although 
the sense of responsibility that he attached to white privilege had a 
distinctively eighteenth-century cast to it. Harlan, a Lincoln appointee 
from Kentucky, was the only former slaveholder on the Court at the 
time he wrote his lone dissents in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 and 
in Plessy v. Ferguson a decade later.
36
 The former held that owners of 
public accommodations, like hotels and theaters, were privileged to 
do business with people or not as they chose and neither subordinated 
people by denying them admission according to race
37
 nor violated 
their civil rights in any way that the Fourteenth Amendment 
authorized Congress to sanction.
38
 Dissenting, Justice Harlan insisted 
that innkeepers and their ilk depended for their businesses on any 
number of privileges granted by the public, from business 
incorporation to access to public transportation, and that they 
therefore had the responsibility to treat all members of the public 
alike.
39
 It no more invaded the legitimate privileges of white 
businesspeople (the legal term was “social rights”) to require them to 
treat black customers the same as whites than it would for them to 
mingle with black people on the street, in a court of law, or at the 
post office.
40
 
In Plessy v. Ferguson the Court authorized the State of Louisiana 
to segregate rail coaches for blacks and whites.
41
 Consigning Homer 
 
 34. See Thomas Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 
1, 90 AM. HIST. REV. 339, 346 (1985). 
 35. FONER, supra note 32, at 237 39, 244 45. 
 36. An excellent biography of Harlan is LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC 
ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1999). 
 37. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883). 
 38. Id. at 18 19. 
 39. Id. at 42. 
 40. Id. at 59 60. 
 41. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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Plessy to a “colored” coach neither discriminated against him nor 
marked him with a “badge of inferiority” because, as a person of one-
eighth African blood,
42
 he was “not lawfully entitled to the reputation 
of being a white man.”43 If legal segregation subordinated black 
people in any way, it was “not by reason of anything found in the act, 
but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.”44 Justice Harlan insisted, to the contrary, that everyone 
knew that the point of the statute was precisely to subordinate black 
people: echoing Lincoln, Harlan stated that “[t]he thin disguise of 
‘equal’ accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches [would] 
not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done.”45  
Yet to proclaim that “the destinies of the two races, in this 
country, [were] indissolubly linked together”46 did not mean that the 
two were equal in fact: they were not.
47
 Harlan’s model of race 
relations was only partly that of the post office: the Louisiana statute 
was also vicious because it prevented “a colored maid [from] riding 
in the same coach with a white woman whom she has been employed 
to serve, and who may need her personal attention while travelling,” 
or “[a] white man [from having] his colored servant with him in the 
same coach, even if his condition of health requires the constant, 
personal assistance of such servant.”48 Blacks were deserving of 
Harlan’s respect, at home and on the street, but they were not his 
equals. Although Harlan’s view of the Civil War Amendments seems 
correct to us today, his view of race privilege betrays a kind of 
paternalism, an eighteenth-century noblesse oblige, that was utterly 
foreign to Lincoln.
49
 
By contrast, although she was born in 1863 to former slaves, the 
journalist Mary Church Terrell displayed a thoroughly modern 
understanding, not only of race privilege but of law as well. Church 
held undergraduate and graduate degrees from Oberlin College; she 
 
 42. Id. at 551. 
 43. Id. at 549. 
 44. Id. at 551. 
 45. Id. at 562. 
 46. Id. at 560. 
 47. Id. at 559. 
 48. Id. at 553. 
 49. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 36, at 21 27, 97 99, 204. 
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was active in women’s suffrage, civil rights, and Progressive 
Republican causes. She helped found the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People in 1909.
50
 She took up the issue of 
lynching in the 1890s when a white mob murdered a friend of hers, a 
Memphis grocer. Lynching—mob killings by hanging or burning at 
the stake, occasionally of whites and other races, but overwhelmingly 
against blacks, primarily though not exclusively in former slave 
states—became prevalent after Reconstruction, peaked in the 1890s, 
and died out gradually after the 1930s. Lynching was a privilege that 
Southern whites of all classes exercised periodically, with the tacit 
cooperation of local police, to vent their economic frustration and to 
reassert their social supremacy. In the face of international 
condemnation of the practice, American authorities took little or no 
action against it until after World War II: Terrell and Frederick 
Douglass urged President Harrison to make a public statement after 
the murder of her grocer friend, for example, but got no response.
51
 
In a 1904 article in the North American Review, Terrell analyzed 
lynching sociologically and proved that victims of lynching were 
usually not even accused, much less convicted, of “the usual crime” 
(that of raping white women).
52
 Instead, she showed that African-
Americans more typically drew violence down upon themselves by 
being successful in business or otherwise rising above the social 
station allotted to them. The idea that black people were lynched for 
actual crimes was a lie thrown up for Northern consumption by 
“southern defenders of the men of prominence.” Terrell argued that 
the real causes of lynching were, first, “the spirit of vengeance and 
intolerance” that arose in the South after emancipation and second, 
the culture of lawlessness that grew out of the ignorance and poverty 
endemic to the South. Fixing it, she wrote, would require educating 
the Southern masses, “lifting them to a higher moral plane,” and 
renewing “popular belief in the principles of liberty and equality 
 
 50. A sketch of Terrell’s life may be found in Debra Newman Ham, Foreword to MARY 
CHURCH TERRELL, A COLORED WOMAN IN A WHITE WORLD 7 (2005). 
 51. MARY CHURCH TERRELL, A COLORED WOMAN IN A WHITE WORLD 454 (2005).  
 52. Mary Church Terrell, Lynching from a Negro Point of View, 178 N. AM. REV. 853, 
855 (1904). See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 384 85; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 117 20 (2002). 
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upon which this government was founded.”53 Where the U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to address white supremacy in any but the 
most formal, antiseptic terms, Terrell subjected lynching, not only as 
an informal exercise of race privilege but in its relations with the law, 
to a sophisticated, sociological analysis that was many years ahead of 
its time. While lynching would remain a privileged activity for 
another half-century, Terrell showed that eliminating it would require 
taking responsibility, not only for the victims of lynching but for its 
perpetrators as well. 
B. The New Deal and Class Privilege: Labor, Civil Rights, and the 
Catholic Left 
American law was as blind to class privilege in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries as it was to white supremacy. 
Emancipation had made blacks and whites formally equal, as Justice 
Bradley put it, so that neither would “be the special favorite of the 
laws.”54 If black people felt that segregation marked them as inferior, 
the Plessy court reasoned, it was “solely because the colored race 
chooses to put that construction upon it.”55 Just so, free contract 
empowered workers and employers equally in any way the law could 
find meaningful.
56
 Statutes that set minimum wages or limited hours 
of work, the courts insisted, unconstitutionally invaded the liberty of 
both. They put the worker “under a legislative tutelage . . . not only 
degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen.”57 
Minimum wages forced from the employer “a compulsory exaction 
. . . for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition 
there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility [and imposes upon 
him] a burden which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a 
whole.”58 The privileges of wealth were as immutable as what the 
Plessy court called “racial instincts”:59 “wherever the right of private 
 
 53. Terrell, supra note 52, at 867 68. 
 54. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. 
 55. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
 56. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 75 (1908). 
 57. Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886). 
 58. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 557 58 (1923). 
 59. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
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property exists,” wrote Justice Pitney in 1915, “there must and will 
be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties 
negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by 
circumstances.”60 So corrupting was the post-Civil War structure of 
wealth inequality and class privilege that it brought the Republic to 
collapse in the economic catastrophe of 1929 31, as race privilege 
had done in the Secession Crisis of 1860 61. 
As the Republican leadership had done in the Civil War, the New 
Deal’s historic achievement was to preserve the ideals of the 
Revolution in a radically changed environment. As Franklin 
Roosevelt put it in his first inaugural address, the Depression had 
made Americans “realize as we have never realized before our 
interdependence on each other”:61 the “rulers of exchange,” who 
knew “only the rules of a generation of self-seekers,” had “fled from 
their high seats in the temple of our civilization.”62 “We may now 
restore that temple to the ancient truths,” he continued, the chief of 
which was that citizenship entailed responsibility as well as privilege: 
“the measure of that restoration lies in the extent to which we apply 
social values more noble than mere monetary profit.”63 As during 
Reconstruction, the New Deal’s chief strategy was to broaden the 
franchise, this time to include industrial workers: by guaranteeing the 
right to organize and bargain collectively,
64
 providing a government 
forum for the resolution of labor disputes,
65
 and legislating standards 
for wages, hours, and working conditions.
66
 In so doing, the New 
Deal stabilized the economy, made business answerable to public 
welfare as never before, and set the foundation for political stability 
in the second half of the century by reprieving labor from the 
outlawry to which “liberty of contract” had condemned it. 
 
 60. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). 
 61. Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 1, 14 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. 73-67, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198 99 (1933). 
 65. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. 74-198, 48 Stat. 449 (1935). 
 66. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. 73-67, § 7(b), 48 Stat. 195, 199 (1933); Fair 
Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938). 
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In one sense, the New Deal did little more than to adapt the 
Founders’ agnostic approach to civic responsibility to twentieth-
century conditions. Labor got rights to organize, but Congress rested 
its guarantee of collective bargaining on its authority to suppress 
industrial conflict rather than to promote industrial democracy; the 
result was that labor relations thereafter mostly concerned wages and 
benefits and left employers’ authority over the workplace 
undiminished.
67
 Nor did the New Deal do much to improve the 
situation of African-Americans, dependent as it was for political 
support on the Southern wing of the Democratic Party. The New Deal 
went a long way, as Roosevelt put it in 1937, toward putting 
“practical controls over blind economic forces and blindly selfish 
men”:68 it gave labor a voice in economic regulation if not industrial 
governance, it established a social welfare system that alleviated 
human suffering, and it began, in Roosevelt’s words, “to bring 
private autocratic powers into their proper subordination to the 
public’s government.”69 But, like the Civil War Amendments, it left 
the basic constitution of private power undisturbed.
70
 
Still, the change that the New Deal wrought in the legal culture 
ultimately made it possible for Wildman and those who followed her 
to talk about privilege in the way that we do. The Supreme Court 
created modern equal protection law when it announced, in a footnote 
of United States v. Carolene Products Co., an economic regulation 
case, that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” was so 
corrosive to the integrity of the legislative process that statutes 
motivated by such prejudice might in the future be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny as such.
71
 Roosevelt himself articulated a 
positive vision of human rights in his “Second Bill of Rights” speech, 
 
 67. See generally CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR 
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880 1960 (1985). 
 68. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937), in 1937 THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 1, 1 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 
1941). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Barton J. Bernstein, The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal 
Reform, in TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 263, 264 
(Barton J. Bernstein ed., 1968); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 1987 COLUM. L. 
REV. 873 (1987). 
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based on the “realization of the fact that true individual freedom 
cannot exist without economic security and independence.”72 
Although neither the Second Bill of Rights nor the Carolene 
Products footnote drew much attention at the time, they nonetheless 
outlined the constitutional history of the next half-century.
73
 The 
Democratic Party included planks in favor of civil rights and against 
lynching for the first time at its 1948 convention.
74
 President 
Johnson, who began his career as a New Dealer, engineered passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: the statute contained a public 
accommodations provision like the one overturned in the 1883 Civil 
Rights Cases, as well as sanctions for workplace discrimination on 
the basis of race or sex.
75
 Women won rights to reproductive 
autonomy, an advance the Supreme Court tied directly to the 
constitutional changes that began with the New Deal.
76
 One of the 
salient points of Wildman’s work is that statutes like the Civil Rights 
Act do little by themselves to undermine the system of privilege that 
generates discrimination;
77
 Reva Siegel and Angela Harris have 
shown how resilient gender- and race-privilege, respectively, have 
proven in the face of legal reform.
78
 The exfoliation of anti-
discrimination law under the New Deal regime has, however, made it 
possible to talk coherently about privilege at all. 
 
 72. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), 
in 1944–45 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32, 41 (Samuel 
I. Rosenman ed., 1950).  
 73. On contemporary reception of the Second Bill of Rights, see DAVID KENNEDY, 
FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929 1945, at 784 
(2001); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM, 1940 1945, at 
424 26 (1970). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004). 
 74. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 
439 44 (2002); DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 638 40 (1992); CARL SOLBERG, HUBERT 
HUMPHREY: A BIOGRAPHY 13 19 (2003).  
 75. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). See ROBERT A. CARO, 
THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PASSAGE OF POWER 558 64 (2012); see also JAMES T. 
PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945 1974, at 543 47 (1996). 
 76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862 65 (1992). 
 77. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 1, at 140 41. 
 78. See Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in 
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There emerged during the New Deal, as well, a peculiarly 
American version of left-wing Catholicism that articulated a modern 
politics of responsibility and foreshadowed the radical vision that 
Latin American Catholics developed later in the century. The main 
progenitor was Dorothy Day, who founded the Catholic Worker 
movement with the French social activist Peter Maurin. Born in 1897, 
Day grew up in Chicago and worked on socialist newspapers there 
and in New York, where she and Maurin founded the Catholic 
Worker newspaper in 1933. Day was a pacifist who advocated direct 
engagement with the poor and empowering workers and the 
unemployed to act on their own behalf; she opposed the New Deal at 
first (because it was run by government) but supported the Southern 
Tenant Farmers’ Union and other organizations directly and 
intervened on behalf of organized workers wherever she could.
79
 She 
counseled resistance to the draft during World War II and the Korean 
and Vietnam wars.
80
 She supported the Church hierarchy and its 
teachings, however, and generally remained in the hierarchy’s good 
graces for her entire life.
81
 Key to the Catholic Worker ministry was 
that it renounced privilege: in their “houses of hospitality,” following 
Saint Francis of Assisi, Catholic Workers lived poor, among the poor, 
“sharing rooms and food and clothes with them,” without preaching 
to them.
82
 
Day’s influence spread around the world and continues to this 
day.
83
 She inspired Michael Harrington, whose writing on poverty in 
postwar America informed the Johnson Administration’s War on 
Poverty: Head Start, Legal Services, and other “community action” 
aspects of Johnson’s Great Society program showed clearly the 
 
 79. JIM FOREST, ALL IS GRACE: A BIOGRAPHY OF DOROTHY DAY 134 43 (2011). 
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influence of Catholic Worker ministry.
84
 The Catholic Worker 
movement also influenced the Peruvian priest Gustavo Gutierrez, 
whose 1971 book, A Theology of Liberation, proclaimed the poor 
“privileged members of the reign of God,” who had “the right . . . to 
think out their own faith.”85 Like Day, Gutierrez preached “a 
theology which does not stop with reflecting on the world, but rather 
tries to be part of the process through which the world is 
transformed.”86 For the Brazilian Leonardo Boff, Liberation 
Theology requires that “we must first understand and then take an 
active part in the real and historical process of liberating the 
oppressed.”87 Like the autonomous Catholic Worker communities 
and farms that grew out of the hostels of the 1930s, thousands of 
Christian Base Communities throughout Latin America gather 
believers for prayer and Bible study combined with political action.  
Here and there, then, in nineteenth-century antislavery, in the New 
Deal, and in the Catholic Left, there have emerged outlines of a 
politics that confronts privilege rather than immunizing it from 
scrutiny, that urges us to take responsibility for those over whom 
society privileges us, in whatever way. In 1862, President Lincoln 
warned the members of Congress, “fellow-citizens, we can not escape 
history.” “We here hold the power and bear the responsibility. In 
giving freedom to the slave we assure freedom to the free—
honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve.”88 Mary 
Church Terrell insisted that race privilege corrupted not only the 
South but the entire nation: “[u]ntil there is a renaissance of popular 
belief in the principles of liberty and equality upon which this 
government was founded, lynching . . . and similar atrocities will 
 
 84. See generally MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1962); Economic Opportunity Act, 78 Stat. 508 (1964); PATTERSON, supra 
note 75, at 533 42; CARO, supra note 75, at 538 (Harrington book catalyzed Johnson 
Administration antipoverty effort). On the Great Society, see FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 52, at 194 95. 
 85. GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND 
SALVATION, at xviii, xxi, xxxiii (Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson eds. & trans., Orbis 
Books 1988). 
 86. Id. at 12. 
 87. LEONARDO BOFF & CLODOVIS BOFF, INTRODUCING LIBERATION THEOLOGY 9 (Paul 
Burns trans., 1988). 
 88. Lincoln, supra note 30, at 142 (italics in original). 
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continue to dishearten and degrade the negro, and stain the fair name 
of the United States.”89 During the Great Depression, President 
Roosevelt described a “change in the moral climate of America,” in 
which “[w]e are determined to make every American citizen the 
subject of this country’s interest and concern; and we will never 
regard any faithful, law-abiding group within our borders as 
superfluous.”90 For all three, responsibility for others was the 
common antidote for the socially, politically, and morally corrosive 
effects of privilege divorced from virtue. 
III. EXERCISING PRIVILEGE RESPONSIBLY 
If we can find a handful of examples in our history of people who 
have understood clearly how privilege works, who have contradicted 
it successfully, or who have put their own privilege to good work in 
society, what can we abstract from them to sketch the outlines of a 
responsible politics? Wildman and her colleagues have written 
mostly about making privilege visible in different areas, as well as 
creating a vocabulary for analyzing it in a useful way. Beyond one’s 
personal life and relationships (particularly with students and 
colleagues, as most of the writers are law professors), this literature 
offers few guides to contradicting privilege in our behavior as 
citizens.
91
 The examples discussed here may offer suggestions for 
individual and collective action, if not toward the end of obliterating 
privilege then at least to exercising it in responsible ways: a guide to 
exercising what in the eighteenth century people called virtue but in a 
modern context. These hints work at the level of the individual, at the 
societal level, and over time. 
At the level of the individual, all of the movements discussed here 
worked because they gave their participants a basis for acting against 
the interests with which society privileged them: they offered a 
compelling logic for exercising empathy, solidarity, virtue 
emancipated from privilege. Michele Landis Dauber showed how 
New Deal strategists overcame political resistance to poor relief by 
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portraying its beneficiaries as victims of something like natural 
disaster and thus more worthy of government assistance than people 
whose hardship was merely economic in nature.
92
 Roberto Unger, 
himself much influenced by the Latin American Catholic Left, wrote 
that a reconstructed politics “would affirm the principle that everyone 
should share, in some way and at some time, responsibility for taking 
care of other people outside his own family.”93 The lawyers, 
schoolteachers, and other white Northerners who at tremendous 
personal risk joined the effort to rebuild Southern society after the 
Civil War offer some of the best examples of this. The slaves freed 
themselves, of course, with the help of the Federal Army,
94
 but 
Reconstruction (as far as it went) also required the assistance of 
privileged Northerners who were willing to sacrifice themselves to 
the cause. Lyndon Johnson—as venal and as calculating a politician 
as the Jim Crow South ever produced—forced the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 through Congress because he was the one with the resources to 
do so and because his upbringing and his training in the New Deal 
made it clear to him that it was the right thing to do.
95
 When an 
advisor cautioned him not “spend his time and power on lost causes, 
no matter how worthy those causes might be,” Johnson’s answer was 
“Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?”96 Race privilege would 
have allowed Johnson to let the problem go at no cost to himself. 
Instead, like the Reconstruction Carpetbaggers, Johnson put his 
privilege to constructive use in the service of others because it was 
his responsibility to do so, then and there.  
At the social level, many of the examples of responsible politics 
outlined here entailed a strategy of working simultaneously within 
and against established institutions, in effect leveraging privilege 
against itself. Dorothy Day was adept at this strategy of “building a 
new society within the shell of the old”: she avoided conflict with the 
 
 92. Michele Landis Dauber, Fate, Responsibility, and ‘Natural’ Disaster Relief: 
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established Church and publicly supported its teachings on such 
issues as forgiveness, if not the Church’s more general campaign to 
enforce a particular way of life. She said that she would shut down 
the Catholic Worker if the bishops ordered her to do so, although 
they never did.
97
 The lawyers who staffed the Great Society’s Legal 
Services Corporation, likewise, worked within the government 
bureaucracy but spent their time making it possible for people 
without access to justice to sue, among other defendants, the 
government. Ronald Reagan fought Legal Services implacably, both 
as Governor of California and as President, because he could not 
tolerate the idea of the government generating lawsuits against 
itself.
98
 Luke Cole, who started as a Legal Services lawyer but later 
co-founded the Center on Race, Poverty, and the Environment in 
northern California, used environmental issues primarily to organize 
poor neighborhoods and to train them in the political skills they 
needed to defend themselves.
99
 The prospect of sainthood for 
Dorothy Day, according to one writer, “is no simple tug-of-war 
between the Catholic left and Roman right. It involves a range of 
conceptions of what it means to be Catholic, and the one that prevails 
very likely will be the prevailing form of Catholicism in the next 
century.”100 Day doubtless understood this while she was alive and 
maintained her ambiguous relationship with the Church hierarchy, 
protecting her privilege while using it against the authorities, in the 
service of the larger struggle. 
Over time, finally, these recessive traditions in American legal 
culture suggest a strategy of effecting change recursively, in small 
steps, by which people learn as they go while building their capacity 
to act responsibly, all the while transforming themselves, their 
politics, and their communities. In a 1974 article about environmental 
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§ 1, at 25; Stuart Taylor, Legal Aid for the Poor Did Work, and That’s the Rub, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 1981, § 4, at 3. 
 99. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for 
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 649 52 (1992); see also LUKE W. COLE & 
SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2000). 
 100. Elie, supra note 81. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol42/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Privilege and Responsibility 45 
 
 
law, the constitutional-law scholar Lawrence Tribe described a 
politics—he called it a “way of acting”—that environmentalism 
suggested to him: people’s ideas about the world, their practices, 
even their ideas about how progress works, interact with each other 
and change over time with experience. Tribe described this evolution 
as a spiral “along which the society moves by successive stages, 
according to laws of motion which themselves undergo gradual 
transformation as society’s position on the spiral, and hence its 
character, changes.”101 Reconstruction after the Civil War worked 
this way: Congressional Republicans started out thinking that simply 
prohibiting legal slavery would make the former slaves “free” in all 
meaningful senses of the word. They learned over time, however, as 
race privilege reasserted itself in the South, that emancipation would 
also require federal guarantees of civil, then political, and finally 
“social” rights.102 This is also, probably, what Unger had in mind 
when he wrote that even the laws of nature are subject to history, co-
evolving along with the phenomena that they explain.
103
 Since the 
end of World War II, Americans have seen one form of privilege 
after another lose its natural, immutable character and appear 
suddenly as the political construct that it is. That Wildman was able 
to develop a general theory of privilege at the end of the century was 
the result of earlier Americans’ struggles to overcome particular 
manifestations of the phenomenon over time. 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of privilege—the network of power that regulates 
people’s behavior toward one another, their senses of themselves, 
their perception of the world—is particularly acute in the United 
States. Not only does American legal culture formally disavow 
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privilege as a relic of eighteenth-century aristocracy, which makes it 
difficult to talk about how it works in our lives today. Our law also 
masks the persistent, pervasive influence of privilege in social life by 
shifting responsibility for the social consequences of our activities 
onto politics and markets, on which we rely in the place of 
eighteenth-century virtue to temper our striving for wealth, power, 
and prestige.
104
 Politics and markets, our main arenas for interacting 
with each other, offer the magic of checks and balances and invisible 
hands to excuse us from exercising our privilege responsibly. This 
was the ingenious solution the Founders developed once it became 
clear that popular governments could not, after all, be trusted to 
follow their traditional leaders (whose virtue was hereditary) or to 
temper factional striving for the benefit of the community. 
The culture has, however, from time to time thrown up occasional 
examples of individuals and groups who did manage to exercise 
virtue in public life and, in doing so, kept the country’s original ideals 
alive while adapting them to changed circumstances. Notable 
examples include the anti-slavery and civil rights movements and the 
twentieth-century campaign to advance the rights of industrial 
workers. These movements, and others like them, may offer hints as 
to how politics might acknowledge privilege while making it 
responsible, to individuals, to the society at large, and to history. In 
the end, being an American is similar in some ways to being a 
Catholic: one is heir to a noble tradition that is nonetheless captive to 
institutions that are prone to corruption and in which privilege lives 
mostly to serve itself. Americans and Catholics also have in common 
great legacies of personal and civic responsibility with which to 
reclaim their virtue as individuals and communities. 
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